Moving Forward in Afghanistan

Stephen DeAngelis

September 3, 2008

The news coming out of Afghanistan over the past several months has been mostly bad. Violence is up and development progress has been stymied by the security situation. For most Americans, Afghanistan was the right conflict to undertake following the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The fact that progress has been spotty and that the Taliban seems to be gaining strength in their Pakistani sanctuaries has generated calls for an Afghani surge comparable to the one that made a difference in Iraq. A surge may be difficult considering the accusations (denied by the U.S.) that it mistakenly attacked a group of civilians recently and killed a number of children [see “U.S. Rejects Claims of Afghan Deaths,” by Candace Rondeaux and Javed Hamdard, Washington Post, 3 September 2008]. As tense as U.S./Afghan relations might be at the moment, even the Afghans understand the importance of creating a secure environment to foster a better future. Sustainable development requires a stable and secure environment. President of the World Bank Group, Robert B. Zoellick, recently provided his thoughts on how to proceed in Afghanistan [“The Key to Rebuilding Afghanistan,” Washington Post, 22 August 2008]. He writes:

“During a recent visit to Afghanistan, I was reminded of the counterinsurgency principles of ‘clear, hold, build.’ In the language of the World Bank Group, that translates to ‘security, governance and development.’ As events in Iraq have shown, who assumes responsibility for these principles is as important as the principles themselves: Local ownership is key to achieving legitimacy and effectiveness.”

Zoellick gets it right when he argues that the path to development begins with security. When he talks about “local ownership” he means that the leaders and citizens of Afghanistan must accept responsibility for Afghanistan’s future. He does not mean that it can succeed without foreign investment partners. More on that later. Zoellick continues:

“Afghanistan has achieved a great deal over the past six years. Even with modest capacity, strong leadership in the ministries of Public Health, Education, and Rural Rehabilitation and Development has begun transforming the country. The Health Ministry, outsourcing through nongovernmental organizations, is supplying basic services and has cut mortality for young children by 26 percent. It is saving 80,000 lives a year. New schools offer classes for 6 million students, the highest level ever, and more than 35 percent of students are girls, up from less than 5 percent in 2001. Almost 500,000 Afghans have benefited from microfinance.”

This progress, of course, is occurring in areas where relative peace and calm has been achieved. Perhaps the most encouraging point Zoellick makes is that Afghanistan’s girls are starting to receive education. Although the percentage remains unacceptably low, it is a start. Zoellick then gives his World Bank Group a pat on the back for their efforts in Afghanistan.

“The National Solidarity Program (NSP) that the World Bank helped launch with former finance minister Ashraf Ghani in 2003 empowers more than 20,000 elected Community Development Councils to allocate modest grants to local priorities, whether micro-hydroelectric generators, schools, roads, irrigation, erosion or water supply projects. It touches more than 17 million Afghans in all 34 provinces and has an economic rate of return of close to 20 percent. The program links self-help with self-determination.”

The common thread running though the projects on Zoellick’s list is hope. Each successful project gives local citizens more hope in the future and encourages them to accept ownership of that future (which generally means a willingness to fight to maintain progress that has already been made). People who have no stake in the future are unlikely to risk their lives to protect such progress for others. Zoellick goes on to discuss the dangers that remain.

“Despite all this progress, danger is apparent as the scheduled 2009 elections draw closer. Food prices are rising, and food availability for winter is uncertain. The Taliban ambush that killed 10 French troops … and the [subsequent] deaths of six more NATO soldiers … underscore the fact that security is slipping in Afghanistan. Corruption — sometimes linked to narcotics — rots away legitimacy and chokes business development, creating a vicious circle: Donors, fearful of fraud, channel two-thirds of their aid outside the government, making it impossible to use the national budget to organize a countrywide effort and to build institutions.”

Having described the good that has been achieved and the risks that could undo it all, Zoellick goes on to describe the need for what my colleague Tom Barnett calls the military/market nexus.

“Where the Taliban networks operate, often from sanctuaries across the border, locals stay on the fence politically. This is not surprising after 25 years of conflict. The Taliban cannot win, because Afghans do not want to live under their brutal theocracy, but the Afghan government could lose. The United States and its NATO partners are likely to send more troops. In combination with a larger, more effective Afghan army, these reinforcements could strengthen security. But as one NATO officer told me, ‘The solution isn’t to just keep killing bad guys, because there will always be more.’ We need to better connect security with local governance and development.”

The military/market nexus is best filled by what Tom calls a System Administrator (SysAdmin) Force whose purpose is to secure the peace using non-kinetic methods. The NATO officer was right. Until Afghanis fight for a brighter future in which they see themselves as the primary stakeholders, the situation will simply remain an intractable hide-and-seek conflict. Zoellick continues:

“The security-development nexus is still too weak in part because the potential partners speak in different tongues. As one Canadian development official put it, ‘Various organizations mean different things when they refer to security; an area secure enough for a soldier may not meet the needs of an Afghan NGO trying to build community development.’ Even the successful Provincial Reconstruction Teams supervised by coalition partners need a transition in more secure areas to give Afghans ownership — and credit for results. Foreign forces and development partners will not succeed without effective Afghan leadership. The government can learn from and build on success. An obvious next step would be in agriculture, where a dynamic Afghan team could counter higher food prices with small-scale irrigation projects, extension services, rural credits, better storage, and improved seeds and fertilizer to expand production and productivity. The energy and minerals sectors offer opportunities, including through investments from China (which, like NATO, is interested in Afghanistan’s success). Kabul needs to decide whether it wants to continue to fund the National Solidarity Program (which the World Bank would finance through the government), cluster the community councils to add to local cohesion, and use the program as an entry point for broader development. My sense is that the NSP, with customization, could work hand in hand with improved security, even in riskier areas.”

Hope spreads from person to person, family to family, street to street, block to block, village to village and region to region until it is the pervasive feeling of the nation. Hope is not something that can be dictated or forced. The reason that NGOs, PRTs, and international organizations must work together is that both bottom-up and top-down approaches are required to help create a climate of hope. Hope cannot grow in the soil of corruption and that is one of the areas that Zoellick says the Afghan government must continue to address.

“The Afghan government recently authorized a new anti-corruption body reporting directly to the president, a special prosecutor of corruption and a dedicated court. The staffing and actions of these bodies need to signal resolve. The government and its partners also need to acknowledge that the current police force is a predator, not a protector, and must be rebuilt. Colombia’s experience has shown that a legitimate state cannot coexist with a thriving narcotics industry, which will corrode the government, businesses and legal systems as well as fund enemies. It will take time to choke the Afghan drug trade, but turning a blind eye endangers the entire country.”

Zoellick doesn’t underestimate the challenges that lie ahead. Neither does he throw his hands up in surrender. He concludes:

“Afghanistan will remain a weak state for some time. Its future depends in part on regional arrangements that minimize manipulation by neighbors. Another key determinant is the Afghan government’s ability to extend and deepen governance — and development — in areas with improved security. Afghanistan’s partners need to connect forces, aid and capacity to build this national ownership.”

With the security situation in Pakistan up in the air and international relationships with Iran also in disarray, getting cooperation from Afghanistan’s neighbors is a daunting challenge. Zoellick understands that becoming prosperous is hard when one lives in a dangerous neighborhood. As much as the U.S. would like to concentrate on making Afghanistan peaceful and prosperous, the fact is that peace and prosperity for the region (including Pakistan and Iran) will provide the best chance for success in Afghanistan.